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Vertical Integration and Trade Policy: The Case of Sugar 
Charles B. Moss and Andrew Schmitz 
Abstract 
The degree of vertical integration in the U.S. sugar industry between raw sugar 
processing and sugar refining cannot be explained using theories of vertical integration 
based on transaction costs (e.g. Williamson). We graphically decompose the economic 
rents accruing to each level in the marketing channel.  Different strategies of several 
major sugar producing, processing and refining entities with regard to sugar quota policy 
are explored. 
1. Introduction 
The decade of the 1990s gave rise to several significant changes in agricultural 
policy in the United States.  Among the most significant of these changes was the 
elimination of the traditional agricultural programs under the FAIR Act of 1996.  
However, some commodity programs escaped elimination, most notably the sugar, 
tobacco, and peanut programs. This paper focuses on the role of vertical integration in the 
U.S. sugar industry.  Specifically, it decomposes graphically the economic rents accruing 
to each level in the marketing channel for sugar in the United States.  This graphical 
decomposition of economic rents is then used to explain the different impacts of a change 
in U.S. sugar policy and the strategies of several major sugar producing, processing and 
refining entities to maximize rents.  Some firms in the industry, such as private sugar 
refiners, push for freer trade while other firms support the current tight sugar import 
quotas.   2
2. Vertical Integration in the U.S. Sugar Industry 
Sugar production in the United States is geographically concentrated. Sugar beet 
production is concentrated in the northern plains with Minnesota and North Dakota 
representing 45 percent of domestic sugar beet production. Florida and Louisiana produce 
over 85 percent of sugarcane grown. Sugarcane produced in Florida and Louisiana 
involves two processing operations unlike sugar beets produced in the northern plains 
where only a single process is involved.  In Florida and Louisiana, sugarcane is delivered 
to a local sugar mill for processing into raw sugar.  Refineries then process the raw sugar 
into refined white sugar in a second stage.  In the northern plains no intermediate raw 
sugar is produced.  This difference in processing gives rise to significant differences in 
economic structures and ownership incentives. 
Differences in climate also give rise to different forms of economic organization 
and structures.  For example, sugarcane producers in Florida are largely protected from 
the risk of a hard freeze while sugarcane producers in Louisiana are typically subject to a 
killing freeze around the December 15 of each year.  As a result, sugarcane milling in 
Louisiana is limited to a 50 day window while the milling window in Florida may be as 
long as 150 days.  Thus, the milling capacity per acre must be larger in Louisiana. 
There are significant differences in sugarcane processing in each region.  In 1989, 
sugarcane in Florida was milled in seven sugar mills with a daily processing capacity of 
14,429 tons of sugarcane per day (Polopolous and Alvarez, 1990).  In addition, roughly 
80 percent of this capacity was owned by actual producers of sugar.  In contrast, in the 
1999 harvest period there were twenty sugar mills in Louisiana, of which half where 
owned by producers.   3
For sugar beet processing, the level of concentration is somewhat lower. Eight 
processors combined have 155,250 tons per day of sugar beet processing capacity (table 
1).  Farmers, through cooperatives, own three processors (American Crystal Sugar 
Company, Minn-Dak Farmers Cooperative, and Southern Minnesota Beet Sugar 
Cooperative). These three processors represent 31 percent of sugar beet processing 
capacity. 
Sugarcane refiners are also highly concentrated (table 2.)  Ownership of these 
refineries is concentrated among six companies. The total refining capacity is 24,175 
short tons of raw sugar per day (table 2).  Of this capacity, roughly 35 percent is owned 
by sugar producers. In addition, except for the new U.S. Sugar Corporation plant in 
Clewiston, most of the plants are at least 50 years old with three plants constructed in the 
1800s.  As table 3 shows, many plants were closed during the 1980s, and two plants were 
closed in the 1990s.  This can be explained by the fact that sugar consumption dropped 
sharply reaching a low in 1985-86 when import quotas where set at low levels. 
3. Rents in a Vertical Market 
The graphical decomposition of economic rents has become a standard 
methodology for determining the economic impacts of agricultural policy changes.  
However, these applications have typically focused on economic rents within a single 
market (e.g. Schmitz, Schmitz and Dumas analysis of changes in economic rents for 
cotton producers given changes in trade policy.)  The recent rise in vertical integration 
within agriculture requires the analysis of changes in economic rents, due to a policy 
change, across an entire marketing channel.  Vertically integrated firms, such as 
sugarcane producers in Florida, may be able to trade economic rents at the farm level for   4
offsetting gains at the processor level due to expanded raw sugar imports.  In fact, these 
tradeoffs could yield dramatically different policy implications. 
As a starting point for our discussion of economic rents within a marketing 
channel, consider the economic rents for the sugarcane industry presented in figure 1.  SF 
is the farm level supply curve, SM is the supply curve of raw sugar from sugar mills, SR is 
the supply curve for refined sugar and ST is the supply curve for sugar offered to 
consumers.  In order to derive the economic rent at each level of production above the 
farm supply curve, the marginal cost curve for each level must be taken through the 
market equilibrium quantity.  The result is four profit levels associated with each level in 
the market channel.  RF is the economic rent accruing to the producers, RM is the 
economic profit accruing to the millers, RR is the economic rent accruing to the refinery, 
and RT is the economic rent accruing to the final marketing activity. 
In order to develop further the economic rent marketing channel model, the 
analysis presented in figure 1 is reformulated into four markets in figure 2. In the first 
panel of figure 2, we present the market for domestic sugarcane.  The supply of raw sugar 
from domestic sources is the constructed by adding the marginal cost of milling to the 
supply of sugarcane.  This market for refined sugar produced from sugarcane is presented 
in the second panel.  This supply is the summation of the supply of raw sugar from the 
first panel plus the marginal cost of refining raw sugar.  The third panel depicts the 
supply of refined sugar from sugar beets.  Sugar beets typically bypass the raw sugar 
stage.  Hence, the supply of refined sugar from sugar beets is the sum of the supply 
function for sugar beets plus the marginal cost of processing sugar beets into refined   5
sugar.  The horizontal summation of refined sugar from sugarcane plus refined sugar 
from sugar beets yields the total supply of refined sugar in the fourth panel. 
Market equilibrium is found by finding the market-clearing price in the final panel 
and working backwards.  The price required to clear the refined sugar market is PRS.  
Tracing this price back to the domestic sugar beet market implies a sugar beet price of 
PSB.  Similarly, the implied price for raw sugar can be found from the second panel (PRC.)  
This implies a price of sugarcane of PC. 
To examine the implications of vertical marketing channels we introduce a fixed 
import of raw sugar under quota of I.  (The main instrument of U.S. sugar policy is tight 
import quotas.) Since the world market price for sugar is significantly lower than the U.S. 
price, the quantity of sugar imported under quota can be depicted as a fixed quantity in 
the relevant price range.  The imported raw sugar shifts the supply of refined sugar from 
sugarcane out to SRC' and the supply of total refined sugar out to SRT'.  The increased 
supply results in a reduced equilibrium sugar price of PRS'.  Taken together, the increased 
supply of raw sugar from the quota and the lower price of refined sugar causes the price 
of raw sugar in the United States to fall to PRC'.  QRD' is the quantity of domestic raw 
sugar produced.  The difference between QRD' and QRC', the total quantity of raw sugar 
processed in the domestic market, is the quantity of sugar imported.  At the decreased 
price for raw sugar, a decreased quantity of sugarcane is produced. 
In addition to the changes in price at each level due to a change in import quotas 
policy, the increased quantity imported has dramatic implications for economic rents at 
each level.  At the farm level, sugarcane farmers lose area A.  Sugar mills suffer a net 
loss of B-C. Similarly, sugar beet producers lose the economic rents in area F and the   6
sugar beet refiners lose the area D-E.  Interestingly, the sugar refineries using raw sugar 
as an input gain J-H.  Similarly, the consumers of sugar gain G. 
As a starting point, consider the case where both sugarcane producers and sugar 
beet producers are completely integrated.  It is clear that sugar beet producers will suffer 
a net loss in economic surplus (D+F-E).  However, the implications for the sugarcane 
producers are less clear.  It may be possible for the sector to experience of net gain if 
J+C-H-A is greater than zero.  However, the current graphical depiction suggests that the 
sugarcane sector will experience a small loss.  This loss will be less severe than the loss 
suffered by sugar beet producers. These results are consistent with the current trends 
toward economic integration observed among sugarcane producers. 
Of course, neither sugarcane producers nor sugar beet producers are completely 
integrated.  While sugarcane production in Florida tends to be highly integrated, 
sugarcane production in Louisiana is not vertically integrated.  Further, relatively little of 
the sugar beet production in the northern plains is integrated.  Figure 3 presents the 
scenario where some fraction of the sugarcane producers is vertically integrated.  
Specifically, we assume that some fraction of the sugarcane producers own sugar milling 
capacity and refining capacity.  Modeling the marginal cost at each level as the sum of 
the marginal cost for integrated producers plus the marginal cost of non-integrated 
producers, we depict the decomposition of economic rents to integration.  The economic 
rents to integrated producers before the quota are equal to A+B.  Hence, these producers 
lose economic rents of B with the introduction of the import quota.  Similarly, integrated 
producers earn rents of E+D before imports and C+D after imports.  Hence, the 
integrated processor suffers an economic loss at the milling level of E-C with the   7
introduction of imports.  Finally, the economic rents before the quota for integrated 
producers at the refining level is H+G while they increase to G+F after the quota.  Thus, 
the change in economic rents at the refinery becomes F-H (an increase in rent.)  The net 
economic gain to integrated sugarcane producers is then F-H-E+C-B. 
It is apparent that sugarcane producers and sugar mills that are not integrated will 
lose economic rents with the expansion of sugar imports while sugar refineries that are 
integrated will benefit from further processing of imported raw sugar, but will clearly 
lose from lower producers prices.  These results have structural implications for the 
industry.  For example expansion of sugar imports leads to a decrease in profitability of 
sugar production in Louisiana for both producers and sugar mills. 
4. Rent Seeking in Vertically Integrated Channels 
The physical characteristics of sugar production, both sugarcane and sugar beets 
imply a unique relationship between producers and processing.  Sugarcane is bulky and 
not well suited for transportation of any appreciable distance before processing.  In 
addition, the timing of milling is critical since sugarcane starts to loose sucrose after 
harvest.  These characteristics have historically implied that sugar milling is located close 
to production.  Intuitively, both entities (the farmer and sugar mills) are dependent on 
each other’s existence for their economic survival. 
Following Coase, Williamson, and Grossman and Hart, these characteristics of 
sugarcane could lead to some degree of integration either through direct ownership or 
long term contracts.  In this literature, vertical integration is the result of transaction 
costs.  Specifically, Coase develops a model where acquiring a commodity through a 
market implies some degree of transaction costs.  These transaction costs can be driven   8
by the cost of determining the quality of the commodity.  Given the transaction costs, the 
buyer may decide to purchase from a supplier or internalize the market through 
integration.  The argument for integration is that the cost of internalization is less than the 
transaction costs in the market. 
Williamson builds on the Coase’s concept by introducing informational costs.  
Under Williamson’s scenario, transaction costs can be generated by bounded rationality 
coupled with the inability to specify complete contracts.  Under Williamson’s 
formulation, firms cannot anticipate all the possible risk that may arise from a business 
venture.  Hence, they form expectations based on bounded rationality.  Within this 
context, investors cannot write complete Arrow-Debreu contracts.  Hence, any business 
agreement is in some sense suboptimal.  This suboptimality is compounded  by what 
Williamson refers to as impacted information, which is actually a form of the incentive 
incompatibility problem.  Specifically, information is impacted if one agent in an 
economic transaction can fail to disclose relevant information, or has an incentive to 
missrepresent relevant information.  Impacted information rules out the ability of firms to 
make wait and see contracts.  Taken together, incomplete contracting and impacted 
information give rise to uncertainties about the future.  However, these uncertainties need 
not imply transaction costs unless the market can also be characterized by a small 
numbers problem.  Thus, bounded rationality, impacted information and small numbers 
combine to form the potential for increased transaction costs through monopoly pricing. 
Grossman and Hart build on Coase and Williamson through the formulation of a 
relationship specific investment.  Grossman and Hart consider the scenario where a car- 
maker purchases body parts from another firm.  Such an arrangement requires the maker   9
of body parts to invest in an expensive die.  Further, this die is useful only for the 
delivery of parts a specific car manufacturer for a specific class of automobiles.  The 
investment in dies is then referred to as a relationship specific investment.  This 
arrangement meets Williamson’s conditions of bounded rationality and incomplete 
contracting since the parties are not able to create complete Arrow-Debreu securities 
since the potential sales of the car are uncertain.  Further, each party to the transaction 
may have an incentive to misrepresent the outcome.  For example, the automobile 
manufacturer may overstate the market potential for the particular make of car, to induce 
a lower price from the part maker.  Given these conditions, Grossman and Hart extend 
Williamson to derive the conditions under which the agents will agree on long-term 
contracts or integrate vertically. 
The construction of sugar mills can be posed within this same structure.  As 
previously stated, the physical characteristics of sugarcane requires the construction of 
sugar mills in the proximity of production.  Given the complexities of the sugar market, 
the construction of complete Arrow-Debreu contracts before the construction of the sugar 
mills are unlikely.  In addition, once constructed such a mill would be at the mercy of 
producers since the producers could refuse to produce sugarcane to make the mill 
financially viable without concessions from the mill owner.  Thus, the transaction costs 
associated with the construction of a sugar mill would be very high in the absence of 
vertical integration especially when the number of producers is small.  Hence, the 
establishment of a sugarcane industry is conditioned on the potential for vertical 
integration.   10
The hold-up problem associated with investment specific relationships is a 
decreasing function of the number of producers.  Returning to the car example, if more 
than one manufacturer uses a given die, the part maker has other potential customers and 
the transaction cost declines.  In the case of sugarcane, as the number of producers 
increases, the hold-up problem associated with the establishment of sugar mills 
diminishes and the need for integration declines.  As the number of producers increases 
vertical integration can be replaced with contracting, as the number of producers offsets 
information impactness.  
In fact, these results are observed in sugarcane production.  As shown earlier, 
large producers in Florida have tended to integrate through direct ownership.  This is in 
contrast to Louisiana where there are relatively many small producers and little 
integration by direction ownership. 
While the Coase, Williamson, and Grossman and Hart literature can be used to 
explain vertical integration between sugarcane producers and sugar mills, the recent trend 
toward integration between sugar mills and sugar refineries cannot be directly explained 
using a transaction cost model.  At the present some of the producer/processor firms in 
Florida are integrating into sugar refining.  U.S. Sugar Corp. recently constructed a sugar 
refinery in Clewiston Florida that can process up to 1,800 tons of raw sugar per day.  
Overall, Florida producers have the capacity to refine from 50 to 60 percent of the raw 
sugar produced in Florida. 
This integration may be better explained by rent seeking behavior using the rent 
models in figures 2 and 3.  Specifically, diversification into sugar refining may provide 
profits to integrated firms under expanded quotas.  Thus, companies such as U.S. Sugar   11
Corp. may be positioning themselves to extract rents from imported raw sugar.  These 
increased rents could be used to partially offset declining profit from domestic sugarcane 
and milling.  This result may be particularly important if the elasticities of supply for 
sugarcane vary significantly between regions.  The sugarcane supply in Florida is far 
more inelastic than sugarcane supply in Louisiana given the lack of profitable alternatives 
on environmentally sensitive land in Florida.  The inelastic nature of the farm level 
supply curve increases the relative loss in economic rents at the farm level in Florida and 
lessens the economic loss to sugar mills.  The relative change in economic rents would 
add additional impetus for previously integrated sugar producers to seek profits by 
refining sugar. 
Another avenue for rent seeking in a vertical marketing channel is added by the 
consideration of multinationals.  Flo-Sun is a large sugarcane producer in the state of 
Florida.  As a part of its operation it controls six sugar mills. Flo-Sun also owns interests 
in sugarcane production and milling in the Dominican Republic. Part of Flo-Sun’s sugar 
production is exported to the U.S. under preferential quota arrangements where the quota 
rents go to Flo-Sun.  This structure introduces an additional economic rent due to 
integration to those depicted in figures 2 and 3.  Specifically, Flo-Sun could gain rents 
from its production in the Dominican Republic if the U.S. would expand the current 
import quota.  This additional opportunity for economic rent makes the incentives for 
Flo-Sun different than those for U.S. Sugar Corp. which generally favors tight import 
quotas.   
Other explanations of expansion into sugar refining through vertical integration 
may involve the reinvestment of past profits from sugarcane production and raw   12
processing.  Also under a firm growth model, these firms may have an incentive to 
reinvest past savings into added activities even though they are interrelated.  From a risk 
perspective, producer investment in sugar refining is a method of risk diversification. 
4. Conclusions 
Vertical integration of sugar producing entities through the marketing channel has 
significant implications for rent seeking in the sugar industry.  Current U.S. sugar policy 
with tight import quotas favors farmers and sugar millers.  Raw sugar mill owners would 
loose economic rents under free trade scenarios because they are not able to process 
imported raw sugar.  This is also true for beet refiners. However, integration into sugar 
refining requires that the economic losses from freer trade must be compared with the 
increased economic rents at the refined level since refiners can benefit from increased 
raw sugar imports.  This can only be the case for sugar cane since beet processors cannot 
compete in the processing of additional imports of raw sugar. This paper examines these 
interactions focusing on geographic differences among producer groups, different 
integration strategies in Florida, and the role of multinationals. 
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Table 1.  1999 Beet Sugar Processors in the United States 




Amalgamated Sugar Company    37,000    Ogden, UT UT
American Crystal Sugar Company  30,400    Moorhead, MN 
Holly Sugar Corporation    22,100    Sugar Land, TX 
Michigan Sugar Company    15,750    Saginaw, MI 
Minn-Dak Farmers Cooperative    7,500    Wahpeton, ND 
Monitor Sugar Company    8,000    Bay City, MI 
Southern Minnesota Beet          
  Sugar Cooperative    10,000    Renville, MN 
Western Sugar Company    24,500    Scottsbluff, NE 
  Total    155,250     
aLocation refers to the location of the corporate office. 
   15
 
Table 2.  Cane Sugar Refining Companies (1898-1998) 
Company  Refinery Location  Capacity
a  Year Built 
California & Hawaiian Sugar Co.
b  Crockett  3,400  1898 
830 Loring Avenue       
Crockett, California  94525       
[510 787-2121]       
       
Florida Crystals Refinery*  South Bay  925  1978 
PO Box 86       
South Bay, Florida  33493       
[407 996-9072]       
       
Imperial Sugar Company
b   Clewiston, FL  850  1889 
PO Box 9  Gramercy, LA  2,150   
Sugar Land, Texas  77487  Port Wentworth, GA  3,100   
[281 491-9181]  Sugar Land  1,950   
       
Refined Sugars, Inc.
b**   Yonkers  2,000  1938 
One Federal Street       
Yonkers, New York  10702       
[914 963-2400]       
       
Tate & Lyle North American Sugars Inc.
b   Baltimore  3,000  1922 
1114 Avenue of the Americas  Brooklyn  2,000  1865 
24th Floor  Chalmette, LA  3,000  1908 
New York, New York  10036       
[201 896-6066]       
       
U.S. Sugar Corporation  Clewiston  1,800  1998 
PO Drawer 1207       
Clewiston, Florida  33440       
[941 983-8121]   
 
Total Capacity (tons of raw sugar per day)           24,175 
Percentage owned by producers               33.6%          
a - 24-hour melting capacity, short tons, raw value 
b - Member of United States Cane Sugar Refiners' Association 
* - Owned by Fanjul Family 
** - Purchased by the Fanjul Family and others in the late 1990s   16
 
Table 3. Cane Sugar Refining Industry Profile: 1999 
Refinery Location    Company  Capacity
a     
Aiea, Hawaii    C & H      142    Closed 12/96 
Baltimore, 
Maryland 
  Domino (Tate & Lyle)  3,000       
Belle Glade, Florida    Florida Sugar    390    Closed 3/86 
Boston, Massachusetts  Amstar (Domino)    1,000    Closed 3/88 
Boston, Massachusetts  Revere      1,200    Closed 5/84 
Brooklyn, New York  Domino (Tate & Lyle)  2,000       
Brooklyn, New York  Revere      1,120    Closed 3/85 
Chalmette, 
Louisiana 
  Domino (Tate & Lyle)  3,000       
Chicago, Illinois    Revere      850    Closed 5/84 
Clewiston, Florida    Everglades    850       
Clewiston, Florida    U.S. Sugar    1,800
b       
Crockett, California    C&H      3,400       
Gramercy, 
Louisiana 
  Colonial      2,150       
Mathews, Louisiana    Louisiana Sugarcane  600    Closed 9/85 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania  Amstar (Domino)    2,100    Closed 10/82 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania  National      2,100    Closed 9/81 
Port Wentworth, Georgia  Savannah      3,100       
Reserve, Louisiana    Godchaux Henderson  1,900    Closed 1/85 
St. Louis, Missouri    Industrial      300    Closed 3/87 
South Bay, Florida    Florida Crystals    925       
Sugar Land, Texas    Imperial Sugar    1,950       
Supreme, Louisiana    Supreme Sugar    850    Closed 10/95 
Yonkers, New York    Refined Sugars    2,000       
                   
      Total Operating Capacity  23, 175       
                   
a - 24-hour melting capacity, short tons, raw value, as reported by USDA.     
b - As reported by Sugar Journal             
                   
 























































Figure 2. Decomposition of Rents with Import Quota






























Figure 3. Decomposition of Rents to the Integrated Firm
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